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WHAT WE SHARE 
7homas D. Eisele * 
A chieffunction of any society, human or subhuman, is education. Sir 
Arthur Keith once described education as the first industry of any 
species; should the industry fail, the species will become extinct. Few 
higher primates center their social life on the family. And so, with 
their slow-growing young, education is mostly accomplished through 
the traditions of the entire troop. The young learn from their elders 
what the elders when young learned from theirs; and so, whatever the 
wisdom gained from experience the troop may possess, it is handed 
down from generation to generation. Man may have the immense 
advantage of the oral or written word. But the process is the same. 
-Robert Ardrey' 
Anyone involved in legal education today may wonder where we are, 
and what we are doing, in our task of teaching. While I am no better 
placed than anyone else to be able to offer anything approaching a 
synoptic view of legal education, I can still offer a few thoughts on 
teaching law. These thoughts are meant neither as a dire warning nor 
as a call to action. They are published, rather, out of a desire to share 
some ideas I have culled from the experience of teaching these past 
twenty years in law school. Teachers and students who find themselves 
implicated in my claims and characterizations may wish to try out 
further in their own ways whatever they find profitable in my remarks. 
I. HOLMES'S TEACHING 
More than a century ago, Mr. Justice Holmes, searching for a way to 
tell students at Boston University Law School how they might best study 
and learn the law, came up with some stern advice. In his typically 
tough-minded way, Holmes told the law students: "When we study law 
we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession. Weare 
studying what we shall want in order to appear before jud~es, or to 
advise people in such a way as to keep them out of court." This is 
hard-headed advice that portrays the law as a set of knowable materials 
• Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. I would like to take this opportunity to single out Bob 
Uoyd,Joe Cook, and Dick Wirtz, former colleagues of mine at the University of Tennessee College of Law, 
and Weldon Patterson, Marshall Peterson, and Mark Jendrek, former students of mine at the same 
school-all of whom have taught me much about what it is to teach law, what it is to learn law, and what 
it is to li\'e the law. r\'ly thanks to them for sharing my continuing legal education. 
\. Robert Ardrey, Introduction, in EUGENE MARAIS, THE SOULOFTHEApE 1,45 (1969). 
2. O. W. Holmes, The Path qftM Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,457 (1897). 
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that we lawyers use to achieve the results we seek for our clients. We are 
studying in law school "what we shall want" in order for us to appear 
before courts or in order for us to counsel our clients in ways to avoid 
appearing in courts.3 
It is in accord with this View of the law, then, that Holmes goes on to 
say that in the practice and profession oflaw, we study "the prediction 
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the 
courtS.,,4 This public force or sanction is "[t]he object of our study" 
because it is what we, or our clients, want to avoid . .'i The "incidence"-
the application or withholding of the application-of the force that the 
government wields is what the "[p]eople want to knoW."6 They want to 
avoid its infliction upon themselves, if at all possible; and, so, they wish 
to know "under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk 
of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves."7 
Who knows such things? Lawyers do; lawyers make it their business 
to know such things. Thus, Holmes says, "it becomes a business to find 
out when this danger [of the threatened application of the state's power] 
is to be feared [by a peace-loving citizen of the state]. ,,0 And this is what 
lawyers get paid to know; this knowledge is "[t]he reason why it is a 
profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise 
them."9 . 
Where does this knowledge that lawyers possess come from? What 
materials do we study to inform ourselves about such things as the 
possible application of the state's monopoly on the public force? 
Holmes says: 
The means of the study are a body of reports, of treatises, and of 
statutes, in this country and in England, extending back for six 
hundred years, and now increasing annually by hundreds. In these 
sibylline leaves are gathered the scattered prophecies of the past upon 
the cases in which the axe will fall. These are what properly have 
been called the oracles of the law. 10 
The cases we study in the common law tradition, according to Holmes, 
gather together the experience of the past in predicting when and where 
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"scattered prophecies" as to "the cases in which the axe will fall." 1 1 And 
we, studying these cases and the past experience with predicting when 
and where the state's power actually has been invoked, or withheld, we 
the present generation can come to a better appreciation, a finer 
apperception, of the likelihood today of the same application or 
withholding of the state's sanctions. At least, that is the hope, the faith, 
we repose in legal study and scholarship: "Far the most important and 
pretty nearly the whole meaning of every new effort oflegal thought is 
to make these prophecies more precise, and to generalize them into a 
thoroughly connected system.,,12 Thus, Holmes goes on to claim: 
It is to make the prophecies easier to be remembered and to be 
understood that the teachings of the decisions of the past are put into 
general propositions and gathered into text-books, or that statutes are 
passed in a general form. The primary rights and duties with which 
jurisprudence busies itself again are nothing but prophecies. IS 
Legal scholarship leads, perhaps, to greater precision in our thought 
about these prophecies, and legal teaching hopefully makes these 
prophecies "easier to be remembered and to beunderstood."'4 But 
these scholarly activities remain based upon "nothing but prophecies" 
about the incidence of state force being applied to private citizens. 13 
It is from this view of legal education· that two of Holmes's most 
famous statements about the law derive. In emphasizing the need to 
acquire a thoroughly business-like knowledge of the law, Holmes opines: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who. finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the 
vaguer sanctions of conscience. 16 
If one wishes to acquire a business-like knowledge of the law, one must 
look solely for "the material consequences" of the law,'? All we care 
about, as lawyers, is acquiring the ability, eventually, to predict those 
material consequences. (Undergirding this Holmesian claim is, I 
suppose, the assumption that all of our clients-good and bad-will 
share, at a minimum, the desire to know when they are threatened with 
II. /d. 
12. /d. at 457-58. 
13. /d. at 458. 
14. Id. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. at 459. 
17. Id. 
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the application of the state's force. So this knowledge of the material 
consequences of the law is the sine qua non required of us lawyers on 
every occasion, since it is the one minimal or irreducible interest shared 
by all of our potential clients.) 
As students of the law, then, we tum ourselves into amateur social 
scientists, predicting where and when the state's courts will apply or 
withhold the power of the state. (That Holmes wishes us students of the 
law to become social scientists of a kind seems fairly inferable from his 
later remark: "For the rational study of the law the black-letter man 
may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of 
statistics and the master of economics." 18) Thus, on Holmes's view of 
the matter, the law consists in our professional predictions of the courts' 
actions and decisions. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.,,19 
This is one of the most famous, and least accepted, statements 
concerning the nature of law. It is not difficult to realize that there is 
something wrong with it; and it is not unusual to consider Holmes's 
conception of the law to be a failure. And, yet, it can be very difficult to 
say why Holmes is wrong here, or in what ways his definition or theory 
of law fails. 20 But, if we try, perhaps we shall discover that, in the 
attempt to dispute it, there is much that Holmes's vision of the law can 
teach us. 
II. JUDGMENT, NOT PREDICTION 
One way to express my discomfort with Holmes's advice to these law 
students is that his words put us in what I consider to be a false relation 
with the law. In one respect, Holmes's view oflaw makes the law more 
certain or substantial (i.e., more scientifically accessible) than I think it 
is. But, in another way, Holmes's view makes the study of law less 
specific than I think it is. Let me see ifl can make either claim clear. 
18. /d. at 469. 
19. /d. at 461. 
20. In speaking of the "failure" of Holmes's theory or definition, I hope I am understood as claiming 
only that I think Holmes fails as a lecturer, a theorist of the law, in presenting his advice to law students as 
to how they should study the law to their best advantage. In this respect only, I consider The Path qfthe Law 
a f'1ilure. It remains the most brilliant and provocative American statement of jurisprudence to be found, 
which is one reason why it is still assigned and read in jurisprudence classes throughout the U.S. today, 
including in my own classes. Holmes's lecture never fails to provoke comment, because it is unfailingly rich 
and unquestionably diverse, almost too much so. A wonderful sketch of its richness and diversity can be 
found in Thomas C. Grey, Plotting The Path of the Law, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 19 (1997). And, for evidence 
that Holmcs the jurist is a bctter teacher of the law than Holmes the jurisprude, please see James Boyd 
White, Ltgal Knowledge, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1396, 1411·24 (2002); stt alsogeneral{y RICHARD POSNER, JVhat 
is Law, and J ~ Ask?, in THE PR08LDIS OFJURISPRUDE"CE 220, 221·28 (1990). 
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There is a sense in which Holmes's advice puts any student of the law 
in an impossible position with respect to the law. In his hard-headed 
advice that we students of the law all need to develop a "business-like" 
knowledge of the law, or appreciation for the law, Holmes seems to 
imagine the law to be a kind of object that is knowable by us, accessible 
by us. And I am not sure that the law is knowable or accessible in the 
way in which Holmes seems to imagine the law to be. 
It is not that I think Holmes credits the law with more solidity than it 
has, for Holmes's maxim that "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will 
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law," 
is a notion obviously meant not to attribute any solidity to the law, not to 
be claiming more solidity for the law than it in fact has.21 What could 
be more fluid, less solid, than mere predictions? Nothing more 
"pretentious" than human predictions of court action is what Holmes 
wishes to call, "the law.,,22 It is hard to see where Holmes goes wrong 
here. 
In addition, Holmes's idea that we lawyers are engaged in an activity 
of "predicting" the outcomes or decisions of court cases is, if wrong, not 
far wrong.23 Holmes's idea certainly seems to capture at least a part of 
our experience of the practice of law. It often feels as though, as 
lawyers, we are being asked to predict or estimate the outcome of cases 
we are arguing or preparing to argue. (I must admit that many times it 
felt this way to me when I practiced law in Chicago back in the 1970s.) 
So what is wrong with Holmes's conception oflaw, with his character-
ization? 
Holmes's lecture seems to me to partake equally of his penchant for 
science (empiricism) and of his skeptical bent, both of which stand 
against certain currents then prevalent in nineteenth century Anglo-
American legal culture. In his emphasis on science and empiricism, 
with their receptivity to the experiential aspects in life and law, Holmes 
confronts the tradition of mechanical jurisprudence which, vaguely put, 
located the essence of law in the rigor of logic or deductive reasoning. 
In this respect, Holmes's gesture is a rejection of the comforting rigidity 
oflogic, and the apparent clarity of deductive reasoning, in favor of the 
more flexible (but less predictable) process of approaching life and law 
through the inductive tools of empirical science. Similarly, in Holmes's 
skeptical disdain for the claims that law must be related to logic or to 
morality in order for the law to be valid, we gain a glimpse of a far less 
tidy, far more uncertain, legal universe. It is a reduced legal universe, 
21. Holmes, supra note 2, at 461. 
22. /d. 
23. /d. 
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where what counts is nothing more than the material consequences of 
our actions, as measured by the application or withholding of the state's 
monopoly on sanctioned force. 
Holmes's desire to emphasize the uncertainty of the law-which he 
does by reducing the rights and duties spoken about in the law as 
nothing but predictions concerning the application of the state's force-
is something most of us probably share with Holmes. In the view from 
the twentieth or twenty-first century, certainties of any kind (legal or 
otherwise) are hard to find. This awareness of uncertainty lends 
plausibility to Holmes's claims about the law and its basis in predictions. 
Yet, when one thinks about it, it seems unlikely that legal officials 
Gudges, legislators, members of the executive branch) are expressing 
mere predictions when they make legal assertions, or when they describe 
or discuss the law. Most often, I think, legal officials are declaring the 
law, saying what the law is. Similarly, lawyers and legal academics 
writing and speaking about the law seem to me to be making normative 
claims-claims which, even if they run contrary to the observable results 
of a case or a statute, are not thereby refuted or disconfirmed by that 
fact. Predictions (if we lawyers or legal officials were speaking predic-
tively) would be refuted or disconfirmed by contrary case results. But 
normative expressions-judgments, declarations, claims, assertions, 
characterizations-can be maintained without inconsistency or 
contradiction, even in the face of untoward results. 
Holmes does not give enough play to the fact that what we are 
dealing with in the law is not a predictive science, but rather a rhetorical 
and practical art, one that is based on the fact that we make judgments 
in the law, not predictions. His claim that we can gain precision and 
more accurate generalizations (or general propositions of law) by 
studying the law and organizing its "prophecies" more systematically, 
suggests an image of the study of law as a social science.24 It also 
suggests that law itself is sufficiendy stable or inert to permit or invite 
such scientific study. But social scientists (according to one model of 
scientific methodology) collect data, run experiments, and generally limit 
their professional efforts to making scientific predictions about the 
observable phenomena. Do lawyers act this way? I do not think that 
they do. 
Holmes's view oflaw promises us a kind of knowledge of the law that 
we cannot achieve. Holmes makes it sound as though we relate to the 
law as a body or set of objects, a set of rules, perhaps, or a compendium 
of cases and statutes, from which we scientifically (and, thus, induc-
24. /d. 
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tively?) generate certain predictions, which we then attempt to confirm 
or disconfirm, in the best fashion of scientific· method. This educational 
philosophy conceives of the law as something approachable and 
knowable as we approach and know natural objects in the world, as 
though the law were a kind of object, or a set of objects-a thing in the 
world-to be studied as scientists study the world. But this seems to me 
to be a fantasy oflaw and its possibilities, although it is one that we often 
entertain.2.'i 
Lawyers have a different relationship with the law than the one 
suggested by Holmes, I believe, because lawyers are engaged in a 
different sort of activity, one that relies upon the exercise of our 
judgment, and not any predictive abilities. Where does our legal 
judgment come from? It comes from the fact, for example, that we 
learn law as a language, learning its terms and its ways of projecting 
those terms into new contexts and cases, learning its ways of making 
sense and making claims, learning to argue within the resources allowed 
us by the language of the law. But we also become initiates of the law 
as a craft, an art, and we become members of the craft as we internalize 
its many norms and ideals, its skills and ways of crafting an opinion, a 
memorandum, a rule of law,· a c'ase's holding, and as we learn to 
distinguish dicta, learn to state the facts of a case, and so on. These skills 
are the methods, the means, we gain from a given form of craft or art, 
and they are passed down to us by our teachers and our mentors, the 
people with whom we serve our apprenticeships. So, too, learning the 
law is a matter of acquiring a practice, of absorbing and assimilating the 
experience of a professional group, by tr:aditional means, by adopting 
and inheriting a tradition, making it our own by inhabiting it as a way 
oflife, a form oflife. 
Holmes gives no credit to the side of the law that is a performative 
human craft, a normative profession.26 Nor does he acknowledge its 
study as being one of the humanities, which for me means, above all, 
that law is a discipline based upon the use and criticism of words, of 
language, and that it is a discipline that consists essentially in acts of 
criticism practiced on previous acts of criticism or professional expres-
sions made within the language of the law. 
23. The best specification that I can give. of many of the problems and failures with this vision of the 
law's "objectification," or of the law.as.object, is set out in my article, Thomas D. Eisele, The Aclu:i!y 'if Being 
a ~er, 34 TE:\:\. L. REV. 343, 363-69 (1987). 
26. This would be the place where it would be useful to develop the fact that Tony Kronman has 
characterized the central virtue of the common . law lawyer as a kind of practical reason, or "practical 
wisdom," although Kronman fully recognizes that his use of this term will be seen as old·fashioned. See 
A;I.'THO"''YKRO:\~IAN, THE LoST LAWYER 2.3(1993). 
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I do not say that any of this is obvious, or that mine is an uncontro-
versial description of the life of the law in these United States; I only say 
that this is how it seems to me. Accordingly, I find more accurate a 
characterization of the common law that combines three different sides 
or aspects of its complicated phenomena. First, as I said above, law is 
itself a kind oflanguage, one requiring imagination in claiming meaning 
for one's experiences and for legal events or actions. Nowhere has this 
vision oflaw been made out better than in the writings ofjames Boyd 
White.27 Second, the common law is' a craft or an art, which entails all 
of the steadying factors and balancing elements (these are norms, not 
scientific or natural laws) we find in crafts or artistic media, as set out 
with depth and detail in Karl Uewellyn's late, magisterial work. 28 And, 
third, the common law is a kind of customary or traditional law, which 
means that it is taught and taken up (taken over) in certain specific ways, 
as suggested in the work of Brian Simpson, among others.29 I want to 
look at this third aspect of the common law in a bit more detail here, 
because it plays most directly a role in helping to show what is wrong 
with Holmes's portrait of the law. 
In an essay first published in 1973, but now reprinted several times, 
Brian Simpson has suggested that the common law cannot be under-
stood or studied scientifically, or positivistically, as some legal positivists 
have proposed doing. Simpson says the common law cannot be so 
studied for the simple reason that the common law does not exist in the 
form that legal positivism supposes or imagines law to exist: as a set of 
rules. "Indeed in an important sense it is in general the case that one 
cannot say what the common law is, if its existence is conceived of as 
consisting of a set of rules, and if saying what the law is means reporting 
what rules are to be found in the catalogue. ,,30 Why this is true can be 
difficult to say, but the gist of Simpson's pitch is that the common law is 
not a system of law laid down or posited by anyone, or by anyone 
authority. Thus, contrary to the claims of a variety oflegal positivists, 
the common law is not a code or codification of rules. The common law 
is a system, and a system oflaw at that, but its systematic nature is more 
linguistic and normative (as language is similarly systematic, or as a 
27. SeejAMES B[OYD] WHITE, THE LEGAL I~IAGINATION (1973); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN 
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984). 
28. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COM~10N L<\w TRADITION (1960). 
29. See A. W.B. Simpson, 1M Common Law and Ltgal Themy, in OXFORD ESSAYS INjURISPRUDENCE, 
SECO:>:D SERIES 77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973); see also HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION Gamie 
Kal\'cn ed., 1988) (suggesting that constitutional litigation centering around the First Amendment also forms 
a \'iable tradition, similar to that of the common law). 
30. Simpson, supra note 29, at 88. 
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tradition is systematic) than it is rule-laden or rule-bound. The 
positivists, Simpson argues, 
share ... the claim that the law-and this includes the common 
law-consists of a set of rules, a sort of code, which satisfies tests of 
validity prescribed by other rules. Such theories [of law] suffer from 
defects which have their source in the confusion of ideals with reality . 
. . . [I]he reality of the matter is that it is all much more chaotic than 
that.31 
What in Simpson's view makes the common law "chaotic"? It is 
inherently unsettled in that the common law has no dispositive form or 
formulation. 
[I]t is a feature of the common law system that there is no way of 
settling the correct text or formulation of the rules, so that it is 
inherently impossible to state so much as a single rule in what Pollock 
called "any authentic [authoritative?] form of words". How can it be 
said that the common law exists as a system of general rules, when it 
is impossible to say what they are?32 
Simpson then adds the following characterization to his description, 
seemingly to exacerbate the chaos of the common law: 
Nor does the common law system admit the possibility of a court, 
however elevated, reaching a final, authoritative statement of what the 
law is in a general abstract sense. It is as if the system placed particu-
lar value upon dissension, obscurity, and the tentative character of 
judicial utterances. As a system oflegal thought the common law then 
is inherently vague; it is a feature of the system that uniquely 
authentic statements of the rules which, so positivists tell us, comprise 
the common law, cannot be made.33 
The chaos and uncertainty of the common law lead Simpson to 
emphasize that the common law is customary law; as such, the common 
law grows up, as customs grow up among people, and the law is shared 
among these people, as customs are. Accordingly, the common law is 
not a set of rules posited or laid down by a sovereign; rather, "it consists 
of a body of practices observed and ideas received by a caste of law-
yers. ,,34 Simpson goes on to say: 
These ideas and practices exist only in the sense that they are accepted 
and acted upon within the legal profession,just as customary practices 
31. Id. at 86. 
32. /d. at 89. 
33. /d. at 90. 
34. /d. at 94. 
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may be said to exist within a group in the sense that they are observed, 
accepted as appropriate forms of behaviour, and transmitted both by 
example and precept as membership of the group changes. The ideas 
and practices which comprise the common law are customary in that 
their status is thought to be dependent upon conformity with the past, 
and they are traditional in the sense that they are transmitted through 
time as a received body of knowledge and leaming.35 
Simpson pictures the Anglo-American common law system as a body 
oflaw both developed or grown through tradition and passed along by 
tradition. This means that what counts as law is a function of what we, 
the members of the professional community,. count as law, within the 
norms and the ideas and the forms that we learn and earn from the 
tradition into which we have been initiated and in which we have grown 
and flourished. Not just anything counts as law, and what counts as law 
cannot be settled by mere whim. Nor is it the case, however, that what 
counts as law is fixed once and for all, forever. There is resiliency in the 
law; there also is consistency in the law. There is flexibility; there also 
is stability. It is a delicate balance, as is achieved in the projection and 
correction of any word or concept used within any living natural 
language. Stahley Cavell calls this "the simultaneous tolerance and 
intolerance of words," oflanguage.36 
I appealed earlier to the idea thatlaw is a normative profession, and 
I mentioned in passing that Tony Kronman has called our attention to 
"practical wisdom" (or,Aristotelian practical reasoning) as the central 
virtue of common law lawyers. It seems to me that Simpson's character-
ization of the nature of the common law tradition highlights why and 
how this faculty of judgment is central to common law lawyering. 
35. /d. Simpson does acknowledge the fact that we are apt to be very unhappy with such a 
description of the common law and its bases or foundations; his description makes the law sound so flimsy, 
so chimerical. The law depends only on us? Simpson says: 
It is no doubt impossible in principle to attach precision to such notions as ao:eptancc and 
reception within the caste of lawyers, and the definition of membership of this group is 
essentially imprecise. Nevertheless it seems to ine .... that the relative value of formulated 
propositions of the common law depends upon the degree to which such propositions are 
accepted as accurate statements of received ideas or practice, and·one must add the degree 
to which practice is consistent with them~ Now a customary system of law can function only 
if it can preserve a considerable measure of continuity and cohesion, and it can do this only 
if mechanisms exist for the Iransmission of traditional ideas and the encouragement of 
orthodoxy. 
/d. at 95. 
36. STAl'OLEY CAVELL, THECL<\I~IOFREASO:-; 186 (1979); Set also Uf. at182. 
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Simpson says that the rules we formulate for expressing or stating the 
common law "are supported by reason and not authority.,,37 And then 
he immediately adds: 
And nobody, I think, would claim that rationality in the common law 
can be reduced to rules. These familiar facts form the background to 
the [positivistic] notion of tests of validity [for legal rules], which 
involves a claim that legal reasoning and justification is governed by 
rules to an extent which it is not; legal life is far too untidy.38 
The kind of reasoning that takes place in the common law, and the 
kind of status or authority that formulations of legal rules have in the 
common law, are made out by Simpson in a number of statements 
drawn from his essay. First, there is his general claim: "[C]ommon law 
rules enjoy whatever status they possess not because of the circum-
stances of their origin, but because of their continued reception. ,,39 This 
is a reception, I take it, by the caste of professionals who are initiates of 
the common law system, and who thus are its inheritors. Similarly, for 
common law judges, 
the views they express in their opinions ... create precedents, but 
creating a precedent is not the same thing as laying down the law 
Oegislatively]. The opinions they express possess in varying and 
uncertain degree authority, as do opinions expressed by learned 
writers, but to express an authoritative opinion is not the same thing 
as to legislate. There exists no context in which ajudicial statement 
to the effect that this or that is the law confers the status oflaw on the 
words uttered, and it is merely misleading to speak of judicial 
legislation.40 
In the common law, Simpson says, our rules are akin to grammatical 
rules; they are normative:41 
Formulations of the common law are to be conceived of as similar to 
grammarians' rules, which both describe linguistic practices and 
attempt to systematize and order them; such rules serve as guides to 
proper practice since the proper practice is in part the normal 
practice; such formulations are inherently corrigible, for it is always 
possible that they may be improved upon, or require modification as 
what they describe changes.42 
37. Simpson, supra note 29, at 87. 
38. /d. 
39. /d. at 85-86. 
40. ld. 
41. "[\'\lhat is normative is exactly ordinary use itselr." STA:\L.EY C:\ YELL, Must We Mean I Wla! We 
S'!)'?, in 1\ICST WE 1\ 1 E:\:\ WHAT WE SAY? 1,21 (1969). 
42. Simpson, supra note 29, at 94. Earlier, Simpson had made his point in a slightly different way: 
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The rules of law are inherently corrigible, and these rules depend 
upon the members of the relevant system oflaw to serve as their critics 
and correctors. This does not mean that we are simply dealing with 
conventions, or with what happens to be convenient for or acceptable 
to the community. For the craft, the tradition, of the common law has 
values inherent to it, which values regulate both the craft or practice 
itself and its members or initiates-not that it is easy to explain or to 
describe how and why this symbiotic relationship works. "Settled 
doctrines, principles, and rules of the common law are settled because, 
for complex reasons, they happen to be matters upon which agreement 
exists, not, I suspect, because they satisfy [positivistic] tests [of legal 
validity]. The tests are attempts to explain the consensus, not the reason 
for it.,,43 But, if such agreement is not the result of applying these 
jurisprudential tests of legal validity to the various rules of law, then 
what is the reason, or the explanation, for our consensus in the common 
law system? Simpson does not know. (Nor does anyone of us know the 
answer to this question.) Simpson simply says: "In such a system oflaw 
as the common law the explanation for the degree of consensus which 
exists at anyone time will be very complex, and no general explanation 
will be possible, and this remains true today.,,44 
Faced with this uncertainty, and with this limit to our knowledge, 
what are we to do? In the common law, we carry on as best we can. 
"We must start by recognizing what common sense suggests, which is 
that the common law is more like a muddle than a system, and that it 
would be difficult to conceive ofaless systematic body oflaw.,,45 We are 
left with the language of the law and its resources, the methods and skills 
of the craft we have mastered, and the norms and ideals and ambiguities 
and defects of the tradition we have inherited; from these, we go on, we 
persevere, with the life of the law. In doing so, we inevitably make 
judgments, some of which are right, and some of which are wrong. We 
hope, we try, to tell one from the other. But we have no guarantee, no 
assurance, that what we do will be the right thing to do within these 
materials and methods. All we know is that, as professional members of 
the legal system, we are both members of the craft and critics of the 
craft. 
"The reality of the matter is that well settled propositions of law-propositions with which very few would 
disagree-do suITer rejection. The point about the common law is not that everything is always in the 
melting-pot, but that you never quite know what will go in next." /d. at 91. 
43. /d. at 97. 
44. /d. at 96. 
45. /d. at 99. 
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To argue that this or that is the correct view, as academics,judges, and 
counsel do, is to participate in the system, not simply to study it 
scientifically. For the purposes of action the judge or legal advisor 
must of course choose between incompatible views, selecting one or 
other as the law, and the fiction that the common law provides a 
unique solution is only a way of expressing this necessity [of making a 
judgment].46 
III. EDUCATION AS INHERITANCE, AND AS ENGAGEMENT 
If I am right in preferring Simpson's characterization of law to 
Holmes's description, how is it that as acute an obselVer of the law as 
Holmes, a true master of the common law system, can have missed these 
features of the law? In truth, he did not miss them; he merely slights 
them in his account, giving them less emphasis and assigning them less 
importance than I do. But Holmes certainly was aware of the common 
law as a legal system based· upon tradition; in fact, he complains about 
that very characteristic of the common law. 
First, he notes that the "development of our law" has been a gradual 
evolution of the legal system through time, through history, 
like the development of a plant, each generation taking the inevitable 
next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous 
growth. It is perfectly natural and right that it should have been so. 
Imitation is a necessity of human nature, .... Most of the things we 
do, we do for no better reason than that our fathers have dorie them 
or that our neighbors do them, and the same is true of a larger part 
than we suspect of what we think. The reason is a good one, because 
our short life gives us no time for a better, but it is not the best.47 
Life would not be possible, according to Holmes, if we did not imitate 
the past, and in particular the past actions of our ancestors. This is why, 
as Holmes goes on to point out, "in very many cases, if we want to know 
why a rule of law has taken its particular shape, and more or less if we 
want to know why it exists at all, we go to tradition.,,48 
46. /d. at 97; see also KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note 28, at 213 (footnote omitted): 
[AJ hard-eyed description of all the things which an authority might correct[:y be made to 
mean, i.e., a laying out of the huge range of doctrine, any single aspect of which could in posse 
prove to be its "true" meaning, this seemed with reference to our appellate judging to be a 
revelation, an exposure, an unmasking, of vagrant uncertainty; .... The whole set of such 
misconceptions rooted in part in the illusion of dogmatics that there should be, must be, can 
be only one single right answer, that a multiplicity of answers is wrong, is contra-nature, and 
as applied to a part oflaw-govemment, is practically subversive. 
47. Holmes, supra note 2, at 468. 
48. /d. at 469; see also id. at 472: "Everywhere the basis of principle is tradition, to such an extent that 
we even are in danger of making the role of history more important than it is." 
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But, while Holmes acknowledges the role played by history and 
tradition in the past development of the law, he also thinks that there is 
a better way, a more rational way, to order and systematize our laws: 
he seeks a change in the way we think about and deal with the law. 
Holmes says, for example, "that a body oflaw is more rational and more 
civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely 
to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end 
are stated or are ready to be stated in words.,,49 This rationalized 
ordering of the law is what Holmes calls "the order ofreason,,,5o and it 
is the path which he wants the future development of the law to take. 
Thus, he heartily recommends to us, or, to the B.U. law students, the 
following principle of action: "It is revolting to have no better reason for 
a rule oflaw than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It 
is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of 
the past.,,51 Holmes says that we must, or should, do better, even if we 
manage to do better only in our little comer of the legal world. "[E] ach 
of us [might] try to set some comer of his world in the order of reason, 
or ... all of us collectively should ... aspire to carry reason as far as it 
will go through the whole domain [of the law].,,52 
This recommendation of the further rationalization of the law, of the 
additional rational ordering and systematizing of the chaotic and 
unsystematic common law, leads Holmes, at the very end of his lecture 
to the B.U.law students, to suggest that, ultimately, we need the help of 
jurisprudence if we are to get the most out of our studies oflaw. 
There is another study which sometimes is under valued by the 
practical minded, for which I wish to say a good word, although I 
think a good deal of pretty poor stuff goes under that name. I mean 
the study of what is called jurisprudence. Jurisprudence, as I look at 
it, is simply law in its most generalized part. Every effort to reduce a 
case to a rule is an effort of jurisprudence, although the name as used 
in English is confined to the broadest rules and most fundamental 
conceptions. 53 
Although I too am partial to jurisprudential studies, this is where I 
think Holmes goes wrong, for he conceives of jurisprudence as a study 
in abstractions and generalizations about the law, the broader the better. 
"Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the 
49. /d. at 469. 
50. /d. at 468. 
51. /d. at 469. 
52. /d. at 468. 
53. /d. at 474. 
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architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a 
house. The most important improvements of the last twenty-five years 
are improvements in theory.,,54 Just this move toward abstraction and 
generalization betrays Holmes. Holmes is aware, surely, of the law as, 
somehow, being a matter of tradition, or what Simpson calls" custom," 
but Holmes does not value this aspect of the common law; he does not 
respect it. Nor does he see that, as a tradition, the law gets taught and 
passed along in certain specific ways. (This was my reason for saying, 
at the beginning of Section II of this Essay, that Holmes's view of the 
law "makes the study of law less specific than I think it is.") And this 
blindness to the.utter specificity and complexity of the law's teaching, of 
its being passed along as a tradition of knowledge and learning and 
understanding, is what permits Holmes to speak as disparagingly as he 
does about the mere tools, the mere techniques, of teaching law: 
I have been speaking about the study of the law, and I have said next 
to nothing of what commonly is talked about in that connection-text-
books and the case system, and all the machinery with which a student 
comes most immediately in contact. Nor shall I say anything about 
them. Theory is my subject, not· practical details. The modes of 
teaching have been improved since my time, no doubt, but ability and 
industry will master the raw material with any mode.55 
"Theory is my subject, not practical details.,,56 But theory without the 
details is empty. Worse, theory without details is valueless, for it 
sacrifices just the sort of immediacy and relevance that may, in the best 
of professional hands, and Holmes must certainly be counted among 
that group, redeem the otherwise "good deal of pretty poor stuff [that] 
goes under th[e] name [ofjurisprudence],"57 
Is there an alternative to Holmes's suggested path of studying the law? 
I think there is, and this alternative educational route has been described 
in considerable detail in the work of Michael Oakeshott, one of our most 
provocative philosophers of education. Teaching, Oakeshott says, 
involves a personal transaction (he calls it an "engagement") between a 
teacher and a student. It is this personal transaction, this engagement 
between individual human beings, that is the heart and soul of human 
education. So, for. example, Oakeshott says that "the idea [of a] 
'School' is that of a personal transaction between a 'teacher' and a 
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'learner'. The only indispensable equipment of [a] 'School' IS 
teachers."s8 What does this mean? Oakeshott says more about it: 
A teacher is one in whom some part or aspect or passage of this 
inheritance is alive. He has something of which he is a master to 
impart (an ignorant teacher is a contradiction) and he has deliberated 
its worth and the manner in which he is to impart it to a learner whom 
he knows. He is himself the custodian of that "practice" in which an 
inheritance of human understanding survives and is perpetually 
renewed in being imparted to newcomers.59 
Five aspects ofOakeshott's description of the teaching relation attract 
my attention. First, a teacher is normally someone who passes along, 
who makes possible, an "inheritance."6o So learning, on Oakeshott's 
view, is tied up with inheriting something. Inheriting what? A practice 
of some sort, apparently, because, second, a teacher "is a master" who 
"impart[s]" this practice "to a leamer.,,61 Third, the student is "a 
learner whom [the teacher] knoWS.,,62 So, the educational relationship 
is somehow based upon a knowledge of one another; the two partici-
pants are not anonymous to one another. So this will require disclosure, 
of each to the other. (Is this self-disclosure not a prime condition of the 
Socratic method, where each person puts questions to the other, as a 
way of examining each other?) As Oakeshott emphasizes again and 
again in his essay, teaching is, in this respect, a "personal transaction" 
between a teacher and a leamer.63 Fourth, the teacher serves as "the 
custodian of that 'practice' in which an inheritance of human under-
standing survives. ,,64 We teachers pass along a practice that survives 
because we pass it along; its continued existence is not guaranteed 
because its continued inheritance is not guaranteed. Our custodianship 
of the subject taught, of the practice, is required for its survival. And, 
fifth, the practice or tradition being passed along remains vital because 
it "is perpetually renewed in being imparted to newcomers"-the 
activity of passing the practice along sustains and renews that practice. 65 
Most inheritances simply mark the passing of property from one 
generation to another; these inheritances in this respect require nothing 
more active on the part of the heirs than their acceptance of their 
58. Michael Oakeshotl, Educatwn: the Engugtmml and its FrustratWn, in EDUCATION ANDTHEDEVELOP-
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inheritance. Nonetheless, what seems right about calling the passing 
down or passing along of an education, or a tradition, an "inheritance" 
is that, like any inheritance, it is given to the heirs as a gift. It is 
something that we elders hand over, or hand on, to the youngsters in 
our midst, and we do so willingly, happily, prodigally. It is what, in a 
sense, we bequeath them. We want to offer this inheritance to 
them-we desire it-and we make this offer generally without reserva-
tion or hesitation. This is a gift, a donation, not a sale or a purchase. 
Yet the inheritance of an education costs the learners much; it 
requires them to take it over, to accept it, actively. Even though our 
heirs in education do not, and cannot, buy their scholastic inheritance, 
this is not to say that they give nothing or expend nothing in the course 
of acquiring their inheritance. Nor is it to say that their inheritance 
costs them nothing. Just the opposite is true: their inheritance comes 
with all sorts of strings attached. But an inheritance can have conditions 
attached to it and still be an inheritance. The inheritance of education, 
or of a tradition, is, I think, essentially conditional; it is based on 
conditions being met on both sides. 
What are some of these conditions of educational inheritance? 
Oakeshott says: 
If this inheritance were composed of natural "things" or artefacts [sic], 
then its transmission would be hardly more than a mechanical 
formality, a handing over of physical objects. But it is not. It is 
composed of human activities, aspirations, sentiments, images, 
opinions, beliefs, modes of understanding, customs, and practices; in 
short, states of mind which may be entered into only in a procedure 
ofleaming.66 
These "states of mind," Oakeshott goes on to say, "because they 
constitute understandings, can be enjoyed only by virtue of their being 
themselves understood. ,,67 Accordingly, "initiation into this condition 
can be only in an engagement in which the newcomer learns to 
understand. ,,68 
How does one "learn to understand"? 69 This question broaches what 
is, perhaps, the crux of the matter in education. At a minimum, this 
type oflearning seems to require the active participation of both teacher 
and student in the teaching/learning engagement. Oakeshott says: 
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To teach is to bring it about that, somehow, something of worth 
intended by a teacher is learned, understood and remembered by a 
learner. Thus, teaching is a variegated activity which may include 
hinting, suggesting, urging, coaxing, encouraging, guiding, pointing 
out, conversing, instructing, informing, narrating, lecturing, demon-
strating, exercising, testing, examining, criticizing, correcting, tutoring, 
drilling and so on-everything, indeed, which does not belie the 
engagement to impart an understanding. And learning may be 
looking, listening, overhearing, reading, receiving suggestions, 
submitting to guidance, committing to memory, asking questions, 
discussing, experimenting, practising, taking notes, recording, re-
expressing and so on-anything which does not belie the engagement 
to think and to understand. 70 
This catalogue of activities is not meant by Oakeshott to be exhaustive 
or exclusive. Rather, it seems meant to remind us, on the one hand, of 
the multiplicity of efforts that are made on both sides of the teach-
ing/learning relationship; and, on the other, of the fact that both 
teacher and learner must actively engage iflearning is to occur. These 
joint efforts aim to use the teacher's experience and perceptiveness as 
guides to the student's acquisition of a similar ability to apprehend and 
comprehend the world and what we are doing in it. 
That teaching is active, I take to be undeniable. There are occasions, 
of course, when a teacher must be silent, must be patient and wait for 
something to happen from the student's side of the table. This still 
amounts, I think, to active listening. And it has been a long time now 
since I argued that teachers must be, indeed, they inevitably are, models 
for their students. We teach what we enact in front of our students; 
they learn what they see performed in front of them everyday in the 
classroom. 7 I In this respect, Oakeshott remarks: "A human life is 
composed of performances, and each performance is a disclosure of a 
man's [or woman's] beliefs about himself [or herself] and the world and 
an exploit in self-enactment. ,,72 
I have, in past writing, spoken of this element of teaching and 
learning as embodying or displaying "performative knowledge," not 
propositional knowledge.73 In teaching the law, for example, there are 
70. /d. at 25-26. 
71. See Thomas D. Eisele, Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 495, 502-07 (1987). 
72. Oakeshott, supra note 58, at 20; seealso id. at 21: 
A human life is composed of performances, choices to do this rather than that in relation to 
imagined and wished-for outcomes and governed by beliefs, opinions, understandings, 
practices, procedures, rules and recognitions of desirabilities and undesirabilities, impossible 
to engage in merely in virtue of a genetic equipment and without learning to do so. 
73. See Eisele, supra note 71, at 500-0 I. 
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certain things that we do not and cannot communi~ate in words; rather, 
we express them through our actions, our performances. Similarly, 
there are certain things about law that our students must understand 
performatively-they show their understanding by performing or 
through their performances, which is why we ask our students to 
perform certain actions, either in our classes or on their exams. 
I find two parallel recognitions in the later philosophy ofWittgenstein, 
which is a philosophy tied inextricably with teaching, learning, and 
education. One such recognition occurs in his discussion of our 
acquisition and employment of language, when Wittgenstein observes 
that in "a large class of cases-though not forall-... the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language.,,74 This remark emphasizes, simulta-
neously, not only that we need to use a word, to act, in order to generate 
meaning, but also that our activity has meaning only within a wider 
context or form oflife (here, language; but also, in our case, law). 
The second recognition comes in Wittgenstein's emphasis on the 
moment when a student, a leamer, demonstrates his or her knowledge 
of something, their possession of their inheritance, by performing. 
Wittgenstein calls this "knowing how to go on.,,75 It is this capacity or 
capability that, for Wittgenstein, signals that we now understand, that 
we now have inherited our language, and that we now can inhabit it by 
using it. 
The grammar of the word "knows" is evidently closely related to that 
of"can," "is able to." But also closely related to that of "understands" . 
("Mastery" of a technique.) 
But there is also this use of the word "to know": we say "Now I 
know!"-and similarly "Now I can do it!" and "Now I understand!" 
Let us imagine the following example: A writes a series of numbers 
down; B watches him and tries to find a law for the sequence of 
numbers. If he succeeds he exclaims: "Now I can go on!"-So this 
capacity, this understanding, is something that makes its appearance 
in a moment. So let us try and see what it is that makes its appearance 
here.-A has written down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; at this point 
B says he knows how to go on. What happened here?76 
When we know how to go on, in Wittgenstein's parlance, we are at 
home in the language-game in question and we can proceed as a native 
speaker would-which is what we have become. We now know how to 
74. LUDWIG WIlTGENSTEIN, PHlLOsoPHICALINVESTIGATIONS§ 43 (para. I) (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1967). 
75. See, e.g., id. §§ lSI, 154, 155. 
76. /d. §§150,151 (paras. 1-2). 
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use the resources of the tradition that we have inherited. As Cavell puts 
it, 
[Wittgenstein] uses the picture of "continuing a series" as a kind of 
figure of speech for an idea of the meaning of a word, or rather an 
idea of the possession of a concept: to know the meaning of a word, 
to have the concept titled by the word, is to be able to go on with it 
into new contexts-ones we accept as correct for it; and you can do 
this without knowing, so to speak, the formula which determines the 
fresh occurrence, i.e., without being able to articulate the criteria in 
terms of which it is applied.77 
This lack of articulate or explicit knowledge betrays no failure on our 
part. It is a mark of what I am calling "performative knowledge," and 
it is an essential part of teaching and learning law. 
Without such performative knowledge of the law and lawyering, our 
students cannot become lawyers; they cannot participate in the form of 
life of the common law. Knowledge of the law, of a certain kind, 
requires or entails the knower's (the leamer's) participation in the ideas 
and procedures and activities (and, yes, rules) of the law. Or so I 
believe; and I think so too does Oakeshott. 
Being human is recognizing oneself to be related to others, not as parts 
of an organism are related, nor as members of a single, all-inclusive 
"society", but in virtue of participation in multiple understood 
relationships and in the enjoyment of understood, historic languages 
offeelings, sentiments, imaginings, fancies, desires, recognitions, moral 
and religious beliefs, intellectual and practical enterprises, customs, 
conventions, procedures and practices; canons, maxims and principles 
of conduct, rules which denote obligations and offices which specify . 
duties. These languages are continuously invented by those who share 
them; using them is adding to their resources. They do not impose 
demands to think or to "behave" in a certain manner; they are not 
sets of ready-made formulae of self-disclosure and self-enactment; 
they reach those who share them as various invitations to understand, 
to admire, to approve or to disapprove; and they come only in being 
leamed.78 
While good teaching requires the ability to be exemplary on the part 
of the teacher, and requires that the learner be able to follow the teacher 
and what the teacher does, teaching is not so much imitation as it is 
initiation. The "initiated" are, of course, the learners who inherit the 
77. CAVEU., supra note 36, at 122. Cavell goes on to remark that "the examples of 'knowing how 
to continue' give ... a simple or magnified view of teaching and learning, of the transmission of language 
and hence of culture." /d. And, I would add, hence, of law. 
78. Oakeshott, supra note 58, at 20-21. 
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practice; but also, in a paradoxical way, what is initiated is the very 
practice that the learners inherit. The practice itself is revived or 
resuscitated, it begins again-it is initialized, in the act of being taught, 
being passed along and, hence, in being inherited and received by 
others, by newcomers, persons newly initiated to the practice. 
IV. SHARING TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF TEACHING 
In theory, this description of teaching and learning may sound good; 
but how does it work in practice? There is no secret about it: teaching 
and learning of the kind that I have been describing are based on the 
little things we do in school every day, every class, every discussion. As 
noted above, Oakeshott includes as teaching activities "hinting, 
suggesting, urging, coaxing, encouraging, guiding, pointing out, 
conversing, instructing, informing, narrating, lecturing, demonstrating, 
exercising, testing, examining, criticizing, correcting, tutoring, drilling 
and so on-everything, indeed, which does not belie the engagement to 
impart an understanding.,,79 Similarly, learning activities include 
looking, listening, overhearing, reading, receiving suggestions, 
submitting to guidance, committing to memory, asking questions, 
discussing, experimenting, practising, taking notes, recording, re-
expressing and so on-anything which does not belie the engagement 
to think and to understand.80 
Fair enough. But this catalogue assumes that the teacher is guiding or 
pointing out or instructing with respect to something; and similarly that 
the learner is looking, listening, reading in relation to something. What are 
these things that teachers and students share, in relation to which their 
teaching and learning take place? 
They are the modest details which Holmes ignores in his lecture to 
the law students in Boston. "I have been speaking about the study of the 
law, and I have said next to nothing of what commonly is talked about 
in that connection-text-books and the case system, and all the 
machinery with which a student comes most immediately in contact. 
Nor shall I say anything about them. Theory is my subject, not practical 
details."sl Yes, I know some teachers who share this disdain for the 
details of teaching. But, without the details, nothing gets taught, nothing 
learned. The details are essential, as Simpson recognizes in his 
description of the transmission of the common law: "Now a customary 
79. /d. at 25-26. 
80. /d. 
81. Holmes, supra note 2, at 477. 
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system oflaw can function only ifit can preseIVe a considerable measure 
of continuity and cohesion, and it can do this only if mechanisms exist 
for the transmission of traditional ideas and the encouragement of 
orthodoxy.,,82 Holmes calls them the "machinery,,83 of teaching or 
education, and Simpson calls them "mechanisms,,84; we might just settle 
on the more innocuous terms, "tools and techniques." These imple-
ments and these ways of teaching are the means by which we teachers 
teach and our students learn the law. 
I mean this last claim quite literally. The tools and techniques that we 
law teachers use in teaching the law, are (among) our students' means of 
access to the law. They are the ways in which the law is presented, 
made accessible, to our students; they represent or characterize the law 
in our classrooms. These tools and techniques-the case books we use, 
the way we analyze and demonstrate the application of a legal rule, the 
way we read and parse cases in front of our students, the techniques for 
reading statutes that we offer--are how our students gain knowledge of 
the law. How we teach law in our classes shows what we law teachers 
think the law is. 
If I teach nothing but black-letter law in my classes, then the law to 
my students is black-letter. If! pay attention only to the letter of the law 
and not its spirit, or only to the policy enunciated or implied in the law 
and nothing else, or only the cost-benefit analysis applied to the legal 
rule in question and nothing else, then the letter of the law, or that 
policy, or that cost-benefit analysis, is shown to be what I take the law 
to be. It is what I accept as the law. If I teach that the history or the 
context of a case, or of a legal rule, is important in coming to understand 
the meaning or application of that case, or of that rule, then my students 
learn that the history or context of a case, or of a rule, is an important 
part of the law-the students learn that it can lead to understanding 
what the law is, what the law means. 
Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, would call these tools and 
techniques "criteria" of the law.85 These tools and techniques are our 
pedagogical ways of relating ourselves to the law-they are, as I said 
above, our means of access to the law, to learning what the law is and 
what the law means. Wittgenstein says that when we study such criteria, 
we are studying what he calls the "grammar" of the law. Here, 
82. Simpson, supra note 29, at 95. 
83. Holmes, supra note 2, at 477. 
84. Simpson, supra note 29, at 95. 
85. I say slightly morc about this interpretation ofWiugensteinian criteria and grammar, with some 
citations to the relevant materials, in my article, Thomas D. Eisele, "Our RealNeed," 3 CAN.J.L. &JURIS. 5, 
12-13, 30-31 (July 1990). 
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"grammar" means something roughly akin to the "logical relations or 
connections" of the law-if you allow that logic encompasses more than 
merely deductive and inductive relations and connections. 
To learn the law, then, our students must learn to participate in it, 
and their enactment of their burgeoning performative knowledge 
becomes possible only to the extent that they are initiated into the law 
through the tools and techniques of inheriting the law that we, their 
teachers, make available to them. This is a cultural transmission 
between the generations, and it is what I think legal education is based 
upon. So, as Ardrey says in the motto to this essay, "with [our] slow-
growing young, education is mostly accomplished through the traditions 
of the entire troop. ,,86 We elders pass along to the young what we know, 
what we have learned; and what we know and have learned is mostly 
a matter or a result of what we learned, what we were taught, by our 
elders. Thus, as Ardrey puts it: "The young learn from their elders 
what the elders when young learned from theirs; and so, whatever the 
wisdom gained from experience the troop may possess, it is handed 
down from generation to generation. ,,87 
A tradition is a medium, out of which we generate whatever we have 
the care and skill and wisdom to generate in our continuing engagement 
with the world, and with each other, including our students, and with 
ourselves. Here I would like to recall something that G .M. Young once 
said about the importance or centrality of tradition in our lives. In one 
of his essays, Young makes this remark: . 
[I]he conviction which for a long time has regulated my thinking ... 
[and] my writing ... [is] the conviction ... that the material which the 
historian has to observe and the statesman has to direct is in the 
ultimate analysis neither the individual nor the institution, but the 
relationship; and that tradition, being grounded on the one relation-
ship which it is impossible for any of us to evade-J mean the 
relationship between those who are a little older and a little younger; 
say, between experience and inexperience, learning and ignorance 
(Shakespeare might have said simplicity and skill)-is the fundamental 
reality of to-day, out of which to-morrow must be made. When that 
relationship goes wrong, then mischief comes. When that relationship 
goes right, all good accrues to the world.88 
Tradition is based upon the relationship between older and younger, or 
elder and youngster, and it affords us the material by means of which we 
build from the past into the present for the future. If we ignore this in 
86. Ardrey, supra note I, at 45. 
87. /d. 
88. C.M. YOUNG, London Addresm, in TOD.W AND YESTERDAY 110, 128-29 (1948). 
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our law teaching, I think we waste a precious resource; and we risk 
misleading our students about the law and about life. 
